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In 2015, the tenth anniversary of Justice Samuel Alito’s 
ascension to the Court passed without the level of attention 
lavished on the same milestone reached that year by Chief 
Justice John Roberts.1  The difference in attention is 
understandable: the Chief Justiceship has given John Roberts 
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  Thanks to participants at the 
Loyola University Chicago Law School’s Constitutional Law Colloquium, and in 
particular Eric Berger and Corinna Lain, for helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this Essay.  Thanks also to Mark Potkewitz for fine research assistance. 
 1 See, e.g., Symposium, Ten Years as the Chief: Examining a Decade of John 
Roberts on the Supreme Court, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. Issue Num. 2 (2016); 
Constitutional Accountability Center, ROBERTS AT 10: A LOOK AT THE FIRST DECADE 
OF JOHN ROBERTS’S TENURE AS CHIEF JUSTICE, 
http://theusconstitution.org/sites/default/files/briefs/Roberts-at-10-A-Look-
at-the-First-Decade.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ7E-4AB4].  One exception is an 
issue of the Yale Law Journal’s online publication, which published three short 
essays in 2016 devoted to Justice Alito’s first ten years on the Court.  See Brianne 
J. Gorod, Sam Alito: The Court’s Most Consistent Conservative, 126 YALE L.J. F.
362 (2016), www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/sam-alito-the-courts-most-
consistent-conservative [https://perma.cc/A7NE-56KM]; John Harrison, The
Unitary Executive and the Scope of Executive Power, 126 YALE L.J. F. 374 (2016),
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-unitary-executive-and-the-scope-of-
executive-power [https://perma.cc/K9U9-4S8Z]; Neil S. Siegel, The Distinctive
Role of Justice Samuel Alito: From a Politics of Restoration to a Politics of Dissent,
126 YALE L.J. F. 164 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
distinctive-role-of-justice-samuel-alito [https://perma.cc/B8YL-A8QP].
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a level of public prominence and influence that his 
counterparts on the Court cannot match.  At the same time, 
his jurisprudential approach, which mixes an incrementalism 
that observers have suggested masks a long-term agenda with 
high-profile compromise votes,2 make him an irresistible object 
of study. 
But Justice Alito deserves his due.  After all, while Chief 
Justice Roberts replaced a fellow reliable conservative vote 
(that of Chief Justice William Rehnquist), Justice Alito’s 
replacement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor moved the Court 
decisively to the right on several constitutional issues.3  In 
addition to the change in results, however, Justice Alito’s 
rhetoric is also notable and merits consideration.  In a number 
of high-profile cases, Justice Alito has deployed facts and 
employed reasoning and rhetoric in a remarkably interesting 
way, one that this Essay labels “populist.”  The impact of this 
style on law, the Court, and public perceptions of both, 
constitutes interesting and important topics for any student of 
the Court, its place in the American political structure, and the 
nature of the law it pronounces. 
 2 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
In National Federation Chief Justice Roberts provided the fifth vote to uphold the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate that is the heart of the Affordable Care 
Act, but did so based on the taxing power rather than on the more controversial 
Commerce Clause ground.  See also infra note 4. 
 3 Most notably, Justice Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor created a 
slim but durable five-vote majority that is deeply skeptical of campaign finance 
laws.  See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 
721, 728 (2011) (striking down an Arizona law, which provided public funding to 
state office candidates who agreed to limit expenditures, on the basis of the First 
Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (holding that First 
Amendment protects independent corporate expenditures for electioneering 
communications).  Justice O’Connor criticized the result in Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club and has stated that she would have voted the other way in 
Citizens United.  See Jeffrey Rosen, Why I Miss Sandra Day O’Connor, NEW 
REPUBLIC (July 1, 2011) https://newrepublic.com/article/91146/sandra-day-o-
connor-supreme-court-alito [https://perma.cc/73SG-BQJA].  The replacement 
also likely changed the result of the case challenging the federal “partial-birth” 
abortion law, Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), in which a five-justice 
majority including Justice Alito upheld the federal law.  In addition, it is possible 
that this replacement moved the Court to the right on affirmative action cases. 
Even though Justice Kennedy recently authored an opinion for the Court 
upholding the University of Texas’s affirmative action admissions program in 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016), he earlier dissented 
from Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion upholding such a plan in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  Thus, it is possible that, despite his approval of 
the Texas plan, Justice Kennedy remains more grudging than Justice O’Connor 
in his acceptance of such plans, with the result that in some future case Justice 
Alito’s presence on the Court in place of Justice O’Connor may in fact change the 
outcome. 
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Part I of this Essay introduces the topic by identifying and 
considering several evaluations of Justice Alito’s work on the 
Court.  Those evaluations hover near but do not precisely 
reflect this Essay’s thesis; thus, they help contextualize this 
examination.  Part II examines several high-profile cases where 
Justice Alito has written opinions reflecting this populist style. 
Part III evaluates those opinions.  It begins by identifying their 
relevant characteristics—both those that unite them and those 
that distinguish them from each other.  It then explains how 
those opinions differ from opinions written by other justices, 
both those currently on the Court and those who have left it, 
which also emphasized the particular facts of the case.  It 
suggests that the effect of Justice Alito’s writing may be to 
create a parallel, or complementary, mode of communication, 
in which standard doctrinal analysis appears alongside less 
elite and more accessible understandings of the legal issue at 
question—a phenomenon this Essay calls “acoustic 
complementarity.” 
Part III ends by observing that Justice Alito may not be the 
only justice on the current Court who is prone to speaking in 
this register.  Justice Sonia Sotomayor has found a distinctive 
voice of her own, one that at times echoes Justice Alito’s more 
accessible, populist communication.  The fact that her 
adoption of that style is often in the service of viewpoints very 
different from Justice Alito’s suggests that dialogue among the 
justices may soon feature debates between different viewpoints 
employing similar populist rhetoric.  This potential will make 
the Court, and its opinions, a much more interesting locus of 
political and social debate in the coming years. 
The Essay concludes by offering a preliminary evaluation 
of this style.  That evaluation reaches an ambivalent 
conclusion.  Such a style may be problematic, given the 
political and social polarization of American society today. 
However, it also involves and engages the American public in 
the justices’ dialogues about constitutional meaning, and thus 
holds the potential to include the American people more deeply 
in the shaping of that meaning.  In that sense, this style holds 
the promise of evolving into the rhetorical component of 
popular constitutionalists’ calls for a larger public role in 
shaping constitutional law. 
I 
EVALUATIONS OF JUSTICE ALITO 
As noted in the introduction, since his accession to the 
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Court, Justice Alito has not generated the level of interest and 
academic commentary that other members of the conservative 
majority have.  As the introduction noted, Chief Justice 
Roberts has been the subject of intense discussion, not just 
due to his role as Chief Justice, but also because of his 
penchants both for short-term compromise and his suspected 
long-term goal to reshape constitutional law—phenomena that 
sometimes manifest in the same case.4  Similar attention has 
been focused on other justices, as well.  For example, Justice 
Scalia had generated enormous commentary during his career 
on the Court, in particular due to his ongoing campaign to have 
the Court embrace textualist statutory analysis and originalist 
constitutional analysis.  Justice Thomas has similarly 
generated voluminous commentary given his own commitment 
to originalism, which at times has seemed even purer than 
Justice Scalia’s.5  Justice Kennedy’s position at the Court’s 
pivot point, and his embrace of sometimes-inscrutable 
constitutional doctrine, has provided no small share of 
opportunities for commentary.6 
This is not to say that Justice Alito has gone completely 
unnoticed, either in academic literature7 or the popular press. 
Both academic8 and popular9 writings have identified him as 
the most reliable conservative justice on the Court.  For 
example, in 2016, Erwin Chemerinsky trenchantly remarked 
that Justice Alito’s judicial philosophy amounted to the 
 4 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 
(2007) (voting to rule on narrow, statutory grounds, in favor of a challenger to a 
campaign finance regulation, but laying the groundwork for a broader, 
constitutional, attack in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)); Northwest 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (doing the same 
with regard to the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act). 
 5 Cf. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 
(1989) (describing himself as a potentially “faint-hearted” originalist). 
 6 See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, A Faint-hearted Libertarian at Best: The Sweet 
Mystery of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 333–35 
(2010) (reviewing HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY 
M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY (2009)) (noting the importance of Justice Kennedy as the
swing vote on the Court after the retirement of Justice O’Connor).
7 See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 See Tom Donnelly & Brianne Gorod, None to the Right of Samuel Alito, THE
ATLANTIC, Jan. 30, 2016, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/none-to-the-right-of-
samuel-alito/431946/ [https://perma.cc/M4BN-EZUC]; Stephanie Mencimer, 
Conservatives Say They Want Another Antonin Scalia.  They Really Want Another 
Sam Alito, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2016, 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/samuel-alito-profile-antonin-
scalia-supreme-court-appointment [https://perma.cc/AX6H-PV4R].  
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Republican Party platform, while Akhil Amar observed that, 
unlike other conservative or liberal justices, Justice Alito had 
never crossed to the other side of the ideological divide in order 
to create a 5-4 majority.10  Moving beyond simple results-based 
evaluations, Neil Siegel has written that Justice Alito has 
emerged as the voice of “Americans who hold traditionalist 
conservative beliefs” on social issues such as same-sex 
marriage, speech, and crime.11  Clay Calvert, commenting on 
Justice Alito’s First Amendment jurisprudence, identified his 
personal sense of morality and sense of the substantive merit 
of the speech in question as critical to his decision on whether 
to find that speech protected by the First Amendment.12 
Despite characterizations of Justice Alito as the Court’s 
most conservative member,13 commentators have discerned 
other themes as well in Justice Alito’s jurisprudence.  For 
example, observers of his early years on the Court noted his 
tendency to ally with Chief Justice Roberts’s incrementalist 
approach to changing constitutional law.14  That approach, 
which involves distinguishing rather than outright overruling 
disfavored precedent with the possible goal of eventually 
undermining it, has been remarked on extensively as a 
hallmark of the Chief Justice.15  But commentators have also 
noted Justice Alito’s tendency to sign onto the Chief Justice’s 
opinions of this sort, often creating a two- (or sometimes three-
) justice buffer between the liberal bloc seeking to apply the 
precedent expansively (or, as they would say, faithfully) and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, who often called for its outright 
overruling.16  Others have commented on particular aspects of 
 10 See Mencimer, supra note 9.  See also Gorod, supra note 1 (arguing that 
Justice Alito is the Court’s most consistent conservative in terms of results).  
11 See Siegel, supra note 1 at 165. 
 12 See Clay Calvert, Justice Samuel A. Alito’s Lonely War Against Abhorrent, 
Low-Value Expression: A Malleable First Amendment Philosophy Privileging 
Subjective Notions of Morality and Merit, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 115 (2011).  This 
Essay examines two of the cases Professor Calvert discusses.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 25–38 (discussing Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786 (2011) and notes 46–61 (discussing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)). 
13 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., Starr, infra note 16. 
15 See Lawrence Baum, Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers, 
41 OHIO N. L. REV. 567, 587 (2015); Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance 
and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 218 (2009). 
 16 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) 
(Alito, J. joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, J.) (giving a narrow reading to, 
but declining to overrule, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)); Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,458 (2007) [hereinafter WRTL] 
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, J.) (giving a narrow reading to, but declining to 
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his jurisprudence, including constitutional criminal 
procedure17 and the First Amendment.18 
This Essay takes a different tack.  Building on those 
commentators who detect a traditionalist streak in Justice 
Alito’s jurisprudence,19 and, more distantly, those who simply 
see the work of a committed political conservative,20 it 
considers Justice Alito’s rhetorical style as one that reflects a 
constitutional jurisprudence informed by practical, “folk” 
wisdom.  Such a style downplays formal doctrinal rules in favor 
of heavy reliance on the moral equities raised by the facts, or 
at least elevates that latter approach to an equally prominent 
place in constitutional adjudication.  Thus, this approach 
understands the meaning of constitutional and quasi-
constitutional21 rights provisions as at least partially informed 
by “folk” or “common sense” understandings of what those 
provisions should mean or what conduct they value and thus 
protect.  This approach stands in contrast to the prevailing 
approach to constitutional adjudication, one marked by 
formulas that translate the often-vague words of the given 
provision into doctrinal tests consisting of sets of abstract 
“elements” or “prongs.”22  This latter approach can fairly be 
called “elite,” because it values a web of intricate, abstract 
rules likely to be understood only by those learned in the law. 
By contrast, the approach this Essay identifies has a fair claim 
to the term “populist,” given its more direct translation of the 
constitutional text into results based on instinctive reactions 
to the particular underlying facts. 
To be sure, in the current era “populist,” “populism,” 
“elite,” and “elitism” struggle to remain neutral terms rather 
than weapons hurled by political combatants.  Nevertheless, 
overrule, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); see also Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, 
C.J. and Alito, J) (giving a narrow reading to, but declining to overrule, the line
of cases beginning with Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).  For a
discussion of WRTL, Hein, and Justice Alito’s tendency to align with Chief Justice
Robert’s incrementalist approach, see Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at
Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1015, 1020–21 (2008).
17 See Gonzalez, infra note 59 at 696–705. 
18 See Calvert, supra note 12. 
19 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 1. 
20 See, e.g., Mencimer, supra note 9 (quoting Dean Erwin Chemerinsky). 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 73–84 (discussing Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in a Title VII case that had constitutional undertones). 
 22 Commenting on this latter approach several decades ago, Robert Nagel 
described it as “the formulaic constitution.”  See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic 
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165 (1985). 
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there may be real value in considering Justice Alito’s rhetoric 
as “populist,” given both those very battles that currently rage 
in the political arena and the likelihood that Justice Alito will 
remain a member of a slim, but durable majority coalition on 
the Court.  Given that he will likely remain on the prevailing 
side of many cases for the foreseeable future, it behooves us to 
consider what may be driving his approach to deciding cases, 
especially when, as in the examples that follow, he abandons 
either the Court majority’s result or its reasoning. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE 
In a number of high-profile cases Justice Alito has written 
what this Essay calls “discretionary” opinions or components 
thereof—that is, either solitary dissents or concurrences, or 
parts of concurrences or dissents that were unnecessary to his 
explanation of how he would have decided the case.23  These 
opinions presumably reflect Justice Alito’s particular 
concerns, priorities, and rhetorical style, given that he did not 
have to write them in order to register his views on a case.24 
Thus, these opinions provide a particularly valuable window 
into his thinking and his rhetorical approach. 
A. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Several of these opinions are quite striking for their heavy
 23 In one sense, the latter part of this definition is the classic definition of 
dicta.  However, that characterization needs to be qualified in this context.  Some 
of these opinions are either dissents or concurrences in a judgment whose 
majority opinion attracted enough votes to constitute a majority of the Court. 
Thus, when Justice Alito writes such an opinion but then goes beyond what he 
needs to say in order to state his own conclusion about how the case should come 
out, that part of his opinion is not precisely dicta, since the entire opinion is 
unnecessary to the holding of the case. 
 24 Of course, this categorization is not precise.  For example, a dissenting 
opinion when Justice Alito is the only dissenting justice—as he was, for example, 
in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), one of the cases this Essay examines—
should probably be considered “non-discretionary” since, literally, he had nobody 
else to rely on to express his dissenting views.  By contrast, a dissenting opinion 
by Justice Alito that speaks only for him, even though another justice has written 
a dissent (in particular, one that commands the assent of multiple dissenting 
justices) can reasonably be considered “discretionary,” since that other dissent 
was available for Justice Alito to join had he so wished.  Similarly, a component 
of a dissenting or concurring opinion which was not necessary to explain how he 
would have decided the case can also be fairly characterized as “discretionary.” 
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805, 813 (2011) (Alito, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“Having outlined how I would decide this case, I 
will now briefly elaborate on my reasons for questioning the wisdom of the Court’s 
approach.”). 
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reliance on the facts of the case for reasons that go beyond 
obvious relevance to conventional constitutional doctrine. 
Perhaps the most notable opinion on that score is Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in the judgment in Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association,25 a case dealing with the First 
Amendment rights of children to access violent video games. 
In Entertainment Merchants a seven-justice majority struck 
down California’s attempt to limit minors’ access to violent 
video games.  Writing for five of those justices, Justice Scalia 
concluded that access to such speech was historically 
protected, even for children.  As a result of that conclusion, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to California’s content-based 
restriction on that access, and concluded that the statute 
failed that scrutiny. 
Justice Alito’s opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts joined, 
agreed with the majority’s decision to strike down the law.  But 
rather than agreeing with the majority that the law enacted a 
content-based restriction on minors’ access to speech that they 
had a right to view, and in turn failed strict scrutiny, he based 
his vote on the distinct conclusion that the California law was 
unconstitutionally vague.26  That part of his opinion was 
carefully-written and hewed closely to the relevant precedent. 
However, despite his conclusion about the law’s 
unconstitutional vagueness, he continued on to critique the 
majority’s reasoning, which he feared unduly restricted states’ 
leeway to regulate such access through more precisely-drafted 
statutes.27 This latter part of his opinion—a part that, strictly 
speaking, was not necessary in order for him to state the 
reasons for his vote in the case—went into enormous detail 
about the graphic nature of the video games in question. He 
described the violence in “some of these games” as 
“astounding,”28 and then spent a paragraph graphically 
describing some of that violence.29  Seemingly unsatisfied with 
25 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
26 See id. at 805–13 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
27 See id. at 813–16. 
28 Id. at 818. 
29 Id. 
Victims by the dozens are killed with every imaginable implement, 
including machineguns, shotguns, clubs, hammers, axes, swords, and 
chainsaws.  Victims are dismembered, decapitated, disemboweled, set on 
fire, and chopped into little pieces.  They cry out in agony and beg for 
mercy.  Blood gushes, splatters, and pools.  Severed body parts and gobs 
of human remains are graphically shown.  In some games, points are 
awarded based, not only on the number of victims killed, but on the killing 
technique employed. 
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his raw description of that violence, he then highlighted what 
he called the “base,” “antisocial theme[s]”30 of those games, 
which included allowing players to play the role of rapist and 
ethnic cleanser, and to re-enact mass killings and the 
assassination of President Kennedy.31 
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion, 
questioned the relevance to the First Amendment issue of this 
catalog of horrors.  Indeed, he suggested that Justice Alito’s 
expression of revulsion toward that speech unwittingly 
reflected the very reason conventional First Amendment 
doctrine protected it: 
Justice Alito has done considerable independent research 
to identify video games in which “the violence is 
astounding.” . . . Justice Alito recounts all these disgusting 
video games in order to disgust us—but disgust is not a 
valid basis for restricting expression.  And the same is true 
of Justice Alito's description of those video games he has 
discovered that have a racial or ethnic motive for their 
violence . . . .  To what end does he relate this?  Does it 
somehow increase the “aggressiveness” that California 
wishes to suppress?  Who knows?  But it does arouse the 
reader's ire, and the reader’s desire to put an end to this 
horrible message.  Thus, ironically, Justice Alito's argument 
highlights the precise danger posed by the California Act: 
that the ideas expressed by speech—whether it be violence, 
or gore, or racism—and not its objective effects, may be the 
real reason for governmental proscription.32 
To be sure, Justice Alito did provide a reason for his 
presentation of the (deeply troubling) facts surrounding video 
games.  As he explained it, he presented those facts to argue, 
contra the majority, that the interactivity and violence of video 
games renders them qualitatively different from the violent 
books, cartoons, and other child-focused media that the Court 
30 Id. at 818–19. 
It also appears that there is no antisocial theme too base for some in the 
video-game industry to exploit.  There are games in which a player can 
take on the identity and reenact the killings carried out by the 
perpetrators of the murders at Columbine High School and Virginia Tech. 
The objective of one game is to rape a mother and her daughters; in 
another, the goal is to rape Native American women.  There is a game in 
which players engage in ‘ethnic cleansing’ and can choose to gun down 
African–Americans, Latinos, or Jews.  In still another game, players 
attempt to fire a rifle shot into the head of President Kennedy as his 
motorcade passes by the Texas School Book Depository. (footnotes 
omitted). 
31 See id. 
32 Id. at 798–99. 
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had found to be historically accessible to children.33 
Nevertheless, Scalia’s critique of Alito’s factual presentation—
in particular, his accusation that “Justice Alito recounts all 
these disgusting video games in order to disgust us”—reflects 
a suspicion that it was, in fact, the undesirable content of 
those games that made Justice Alito question their 
constitutionally-protected status as applied to minors’ access. 
And indeed, his presentation not just of those games’ violence, 
but of their anti-social themes (e.g., racism and misogyny) does 
indeed suggest that it was their “disgustingness” that mattered 
for his constitutional analysis. 
This introductory example reveals several themes of the 
opinions this Essay identifies as significant.  It shows Justice 
Alito’s willingness to go beyond the record created by the 
parties,34 his focus on the unsavory or unpleasant aspects of 
the case or the claim,35 and, at least according to Justice Scalia 
in Entertainment Merchants, those facts’ lack of relevance to 
the conventional legal doctrine governing that issue.36 
Together, these aspects suggest that the term “populist,” 
as imprecise as it is, may constitute a reasonably appropriate 
description for these sorts of opinions.  If, as suggested in the 
introduction, “populism” implies the opposite of “elitism,” then 
one can understand how going beyond the case’s formal 
record, and focusing on inherently unsettling facts even when 
they do not relate to the governing doctrine, reflects an 
impatience with formal, or elite, legal rules and, instead, favors 
a more instinctive reaction to the case.  After all, as Justice 
Scalia says in Entertainment Merchants, the effect of Justice 
 33 Compare id. at 798 (majority opinion) (“California claims that video games 
present special problems because they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player 
participates in the violent action on screen and determines its outcome. The latter 
feature is nothing new . . . . As for the argument that video games enable 
participation in the violent action, that seems to us more a matter of degree than 
of kind.”) with id. at 816 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Finally, the Court 
is far too quick to dismiss the possibility that the experience of playing video 
games (and the effects on minors of playing violent video games) may be very 
different from anything that we have seen before.”). 
 34 See, e.g., infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (discussing similar 
extra-record research by Justice Alito in his dissenting opinion in Fisher v. 
University of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016)). 
 35 See, e.g., infra notes 49, 78–84 and accompanying text (discussing, 
respectively, Justice Alito’s discussion of similarly unsavory facts in Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009)). 
 36 See, e.g., infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text and 78–84 and 
accompanying text (discussing, respectively, Justice Alito’s focus on arguably-
irrelevant facts in Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) and Ricci, 
557 U.S. 557). 
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Alito’s argument is to “arouse the reader’s ire, and the reader’s 
desire to put an end to this horrible message,”37 and Justice 
Scalia’s answer to his own (rhetorical) question about the 
relevance of those facts to First Amendment doctrine is a 
mystified “[w]ho knows?”38  If one equates “populism” with an 
unlearned but common-sense folk wisdom, then it becomes 
comprehensible to understand arguments such as Justice 
Alito’s vehement criticism of violent video games in 
Entertainment Merchants as a populist one. 
B. Caetano v. Massachusetts
Other examples exist of Justice Alito’s heavy focus on
disturbing, but doctrinally-irrelevant, facts.  In Caetano v. 
Massachusetts,39 the Court held that the Second Amendment 
protected the right of a person to possess a stun gun for self-
defense.  The Court’s per curiam decision, in addition to 
triggering no dissents, was very brief.40  It was also strikingly 
abstract: the Court’s opinion did not mention a word about the 
facts, except to note the decision the Court was reversing.  In 
particular, it failed to mention any facts about Caetano’s arrest 
and conviction, even neglecting to identify Caetano as the 
possessor of the stun gun in question.  Instead, the Court 
simply set forth the lower court’s three justifications for 
upholding the gun possession conviction, and refuted them 
one by one. 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote separately 
in order to chide the majority for what he called its “grudging” 
vindication of the right in question.41  Much of his opinion 
(perhaps tellingly styled a “concurrence in the judgment” 
rather than a simple “concurrence”) was devoted to applying 
Second Amendment doctrine to the facts of the defendant’s 
possession of a stun gun, presumably to make absolutely clear 
how that doctrine supported the Court’s result.  But Justice 
Alito’s opinion began by providing intricate details about the 
facts of Jaime Caetano’s worries about and interaction with her 
ex-boyfriend, even including the dialogue the two persons 
uttered during a confrontation that led her to brandish the 
weapon.42  Strikingly, that confrontation pre-dated the 
37 Entertainment Merchants, 564 U.S. at 799. 
38 Id. 
39 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). 
40 The opinion totals 456 words. See id. at 1027—28. 
41 Id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  
42 See id. at 1028–29. 
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completely-unrelated incident in which police found her gun 
and arrested her for violating the state law that prohibited her 
from possessing it—the incident that gave rise to the case. 
Toward the end of his opinion he again returned to 
Caetano’s particular situation.  He stated that “a weapon is an 
effective means of self-defense only if one is prepared to use it, 
and it is presumptuous to tell Caetano she should have been 
ready to shoot the father of her two young children if she 
wanted to protect herself.”43  Even more tellingly, his opinion 
ended with the following attack on the state’s conduct—an 
attack that went far beyond what was necessary in order to 
establish that Second Amendment doctrine compelled a 
decision striking down the state law: 
A State's most basic responsibility is to keep its people safe. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts was either unable or 
unwilling to do what was necessary to protect Jaime 
Caetano, so she was forced to protect herself.  To make 
matters worse, the Commonwealth chose to deploy its 
prosecutorial resources to prosecute and convict her of a 
criminal offense for arming herself with a nonlethal weapon 
that may well have saved her life.  The Supreme Judicial 
Court then affirmed her conviction on the flimsiest of 
grounds.  This Court's grudging per curiam now sends the 
case back to that same court. And the consequences for 
Caetano may prove more tragic still, as her conviction likely 
bars her from ever bearing arms for self-defense. 
If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect 
Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy 
of state authorities who may be more concerned about 
disarming the people than about keeping them safe.44 
Thus, as in Entertainment Merchants, in Caetano Justice Alito 
wrote an opinion that focused heavily on the facts of the case, 
seemingly to make a point about his understanding of the 
constitutional issue.  Even more so than in Entertainment 
Merchants, his opinion in Caetano was utterly discretionary, 
and his recitation of the facts of the case was even more 
disconnected from the underlying doctrinal analysis than in 
that earlier case. 
In addition to being disconnected from conventional 
Second Amendment doctrine, Justice Alito’s presentation of 
Caetano’s confrontation with her ex-boyfriend was highly 
dramatic.  As he tells the story, an earlier “bad altercation” with 
43 Id. at 1033. 
44 Id. 
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the man had put her in the hospital and left her homeless. 
“She obtained multiple restraining orders . . . but the order 
proved futile.  So when a friend offered her a stun gun for self-
defense against [her] former boy friend, Caetano accepted the 
weapon.”  At that point, Justice Alito added a literary element 
of suspense: beginning the next paragraph of his opinion, he 
wrote, “It is a good thing she did.”  The paragraph that followed 
described the two antagonists’ physical disparities (“Caetano's 
abuser towered over her by nearly a foot and outweighed her 
by close to 100 pounds.”), his threats and her special status as 
a custodial parent (“He ‘started screaming’ that she was ‘not 
gonna [expletive deleted] work at this place’ any more because 
she should be home with the kids they had together.”), and 
culminated in Caetano’s triumph, aided by her exercise of her 
Second-Amendment rights (“But she didn't need physical 
strength to protect herself. She stood her ground, displayed the 
stun gun, and announced: ‘I'm not gonna take this 
anymore. . . .  I don't wanna have to [use the stun gun on] you, 
but if you don't leave me alone, I'm gonna have to.’ The gambit 
worked. The ex-boyfriend ‘got scared and he left [her] 
alone.’”).45 
To be sure, Justice Alito clearly viewed those facts as 
reinforcing the point that the Second Amendment serves to 
guarantee Americans’ right to defend themselves.  But the facts 
of Jaime Caetano’s exercise of that right did nothing to clarify 
that contours of that right beyond highlighting how her 
particular (highly disturbing) facts implicated the underlying 
self-defense justification for the right’s inclusion in the Bill of 
Rights.  And, of course, the exceptionally dramatic nature of 
his presentation of those facts stands yet an additional step 
removed from any relevance to actual Second Amendment 
doctrine. 
C. Snyder v. Phelps
Another notable example of Justice Alito’s deep focus on
facts appears in his dissenting opinion in Snyder v. Phelps.46 
In Snyder the Court threw out tort verdicts reached against the 
Westboro Baptist Church, the controversial anti-Catholic and 
anti-gay ministry that pickets high profile funerals and 
funerals of those the Church believes promote evil, including 
those of soldiers killed in the line of duty.  Snyder involved the 
45 Id. at 1028. 
46 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
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funeral of Matthew Snyder, a Catholic U.S. soldier killed in 
Iraq.  The Church picketed the funeral proceedings held at a 
church; the picketers stood on public property and obeyed 
police instructions throughout. 
An eight-justice majority47 threw out the lower court’s 
verdict against the church for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.48  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded that the Church’s speech, dealing with 
matters such as the nation’s policy toward homosexuality and 
the Catholic Church’s sexual abuse scandal, addressed 
matters of public importance.  Given the protected nature of 
their speech, and the fact that the picketers expressed their 
views on public property while complying with police 
directions, the Court found that the tort verdict against the 
Church violated the First Amendment. 
Justice Alito dissented.  The first section of his opinion 
consisted of a graphic recounting of the hateful speech made 
by the Church, coupled with a disapproving explanation of its 
strategy of picketing military and other high-profile funerals in 
order to obtain publicity.49  Strikingly, he preceded this 
recitation with a statement that the Church had abandoned 
any claim that its speech did not satisfy the standards for 
liability under the intentional infliction tort.50  That 
conclusion—that there was no need to establish whether the 
speech satisfied the standard for IIED liability—removed the 
primary justification he might have had for recounting the 
facts. 
It appears that only two possible doctrinal reasons exist 
for his presentation of these facts.  First, he may have 
presented them in order to demonstrate that the speech was 
not on matters of public interest.  This is a very weak 
argument: while it is likely that both the majority and dissent 
selectively presented the messages on the Church’s picket 
signs,51 the majority opinion clearly established the Church’s 
preoccupation with larger social and political issues, and the 
 47 Justice Breyer joined the majority opinion but also wrote a separate 
concurrence.  See id. at 461 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 48 The Court also threw out the intrusion on seclusion and civil conspiracy 
verdicts.  See id. at 459–60.  However, the IIED verdict occupied the largest part 
of the Court’s attention.  Compare id. at 451–59 (analyzing the IIED claims) with 
id. at 459–60 (analyzing the other two claims). 
49 See id. at 466–71 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
50 See id. at 464–65. 
 51 Compare id. at 454 (majority opinion) with id. at 468–70 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
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connection the Church drew between those issues and the 
individuals whose funerals it chose to picket.  This conclusion 
also reflects the generally-recognized fact that the Church is in 
fact quite outspoken on those general issues.52 
Second, Justice Alito may have recited those facts in order 
to show that the Church’s speech “intentionally inflicted” 
“grave injury.”53  As he argued just before launching into that 
recitation, such a conclusion would prove, in his view, that the 
speech therefore fell into an unprotected category, as words 
that “form ‘no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are 
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit 
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’”54  Regardless of its 
correctness as a matter of doctrine,55 this latter argument 
necessarily means that the constitutional status of particular 
types of speech turns on what the Court has, on other 
occasions, characterized as an ad hoc judicial or legislative 
balancing of the costs and benefits of speech.56  The Court’s 
characterization of this approach as ad hoc is pejorative;57 for 
Justice Alito, however, it would fit neatly into an approach in 
which the cruelty of particular speech was relevant to its 
constitutionally-protected status.58 
Given that possible explanation for his inclusion of those 
facts, the length, detail, and agitated tone of his presentation 
makes perfect sense.  If the point of that presentation is to 
show how cruel and hateful the Church’s speech was, then one 
would expect him to describe it in the ways that he did—
 52 Indeed, Justice Alito himself may have implicitly conceded the weakness 
of his argument when he stated that he had “attempted to show” the private focus 
of the Church’s speech.  Id. at 471 (emphasis added).  
53 Id. at 465. 
 54 Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).  To 
be sure, as is well-known, the Court has recently insisted that the Chaplinsky 
categories of unprotected speech are derived from historical analysis, and are not 
susceptible to supplementation by ad hoc weighing of the costs and benefits of 
new candidates for inclusion.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 
(2010); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011); Alvarez v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).  Strikingly, Justice Alito is the only 
justice who has not joined any of those majority opinions. See infra note 105. 
55 See cases cited supra note 54 (criticizing such an approach to identifying 
unprotected categories of speech). 
56 See cases cited supra note 54. 
 57 See cases cited supra note 54 (describing that approach as “startling and 
dangerous”). 
58 See Calvert, supra note 12; see also infra note 105 (noting that, of the 
current justices (other than Justice Gorsuch), only Justice Alito has declined to 
join an opinion rejecting such an ad hoc approach). 
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graphically, at length, and with an anguished tone.59  Indeed, 
it also explains his otherwise-curious insistence on noting that 
the Church had many alternative locations to make its 
speech—literally, anywhere else in the nation, but at least at 
many other sites that might be related to the Catholic Church, 
the military, or to government policy.60  By noting that the 
Church’s practice of picketing military and other high-profile 
funerals garnered it attention, he may have been hoping to 
buttress his argument that the Church intentionally singled 
out events like the Snyder funeral as fora for its speech.61 
Again, the raw ugliness of the Church’s conduct—not just in 
terms of the speech but in its intentional choice of the funeral 
to make that speech—perhaps helped Justice Alito argue that 
it should be unprotected based on the ad hoc balancing he 
argued underlay Chaplinsky.62 
D. Fisher v. University of Texas
A recent opinion by Justice Alito reflects an indictment of
state officials similar to the one he delivered several years 
earlier in Caetano.  In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,63 
 59 See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, In Search of Justice: An Examination of the 
Appointments of John G. Roberts and Samuel A. Alito to the Supreme Court and 
Their Impact on American Jurisprudence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 647, 707 
(2014) (describing Justice Alito’s arguments in Snyder as “not as concise as some 
of his other disagreements with the majority, nor . . . founded squarely in 
precedent” and concluding that “what Justice Alito conveyed most clearly in his 
dissent was concern for the victim of what he perceives as an unjust assault”); 
see also id. at 707 n.557 (Speculating that “Justice Alito argues for a practical, 
impact-based solution against arguments often grounded more in ideal”). 
 60 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 466 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“On 
the morning of Matthew Snyder’s funeral, respondents could have chosen to 
stage their protest at countless locations. They could have picketed the United 
States Capitol, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, or any of the 
more than 5,600 military recruiting stations in this country. They could have 
returned to the Maryland State House or the United States Naval Academy, where 
they had been the day before. They could have selected any public road where 
pedestrians are allowed. (There are more than 4,000,000 miles of public roads in 
the United States.) They could have staged their protest in a public park. (There 
are more than 20,000 public parks in this country.) They could have chosen any 
Catholic church where no funeral was taking place. (There are nearly 19,000 
Catholic churches in the United States.)”).  See also Calvert, supra note 12 at 150 
(commenting on this aspect of Justice Alito’s opinion by noting that “[b]eing 
media savvy in terms of staging news events . . . does not exempt one from the 
protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 61 Cf. Snyder, 562 U.S. at 465 (Alito, J., dissenting) (specifying that the 
unprotected status of speech of this sort depends in part on whether the injury 
the speech caused was “intentionally inflicted”). 
62  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
63 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
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Justice Alito wrote the lead dissent64 to a four-justice majority 
opinion65 upholding the University of Texas undergraduate 
college’s use of race as an admissions factor.  Both Justice 
Kennedy’s majority and Justice Alito’s dissenting opinions 
agreed that the university’s admissions plan had to satisfy 
strict scrutiny in order to survive.  However, they disagreed—
fundamentally—on whether the plan satisfied that standard. 
Justice Alito’s argument that the plan failed strict scrutiny was 
suffused throughout with distrust of the university’s officials.66 
Justice Alito’s expression of distrust does not necessarily 
constitute a case of ignoring doctrine in favor of reaching a gut 
decision condemning the school.  Rather, strict scrutiny in the 
university admissions context requires schools to make good-
faith efforts to find non-race-based methods of achieving the 
constitutionally-legitimate goal of a diverse student body.67 
Justice Alito’s dissent accused the University of Texas of failing 
to make such efforts.  For example, he rejected the school’s 
argument that the minority students admitted under the 
university’s race-blind “Top Ten Percent” program did not fully 
satisfy the school’s diversity goals for particular classes, 
observing that the school failed to track those students’ 
curricular choices as compared with minority students 
admitted through its race-conscious program.68  He found 
another reason to question the school’s good faith when he 
questioned why the school’s concern with critical masses of 
Latino and African-American students did not apply to Asian-
Americans, even though they constituted a smaller portion of 
the university’s undergraduate class than Latinos.69 
But Justice Alito’s allegations of bad faith went beyond the 
limited context of the university’s obligation to seek out race-
neutral means of attaining its legitimate goals, and that, in 
 64 Justice Alito wrote for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas. 
Justice Thomas wrote a brief separate dissent for himself only. 
 65 Justice Kennedy wrote for himself and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor.  Justice Scalia had died before the case was handed down, while 
Justice Kagan recused herself. 
 66 E.g., id. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To the extent that [the University] 
has ever moved beyond a plea for deference and identified the relevant interests 
in more specific terms, its efforts have been shifting, unpersuasive, and, at times, 
less than candid.”). 
 67 See, e.g., id. at 2208 (majority opinion) (“A university . . . bears the burden 
of proving a nonracial approach would not promote its interest in the educational 
benefits of diversity about as well and at tolerable administrative expense.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
68 See id. at 2226–30 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
69 See id. at 2226–30, 2236. 
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order to be credible, race-conscious actions motivated by such 
goals should apply to all minority races.  Most notably, again 
going beyond the record,70 he accused the university of 
deviating from its stated admissions procedures, not in the 
context of race, but rather as part of a scheme to admit 
applicants at the behest of “politically connected individuals.”71 
This accusation did not directly impact the credibility of the 
university’s race-based admissions policies; nevertheless, 
Justice Alito wielded it to cast doubt on the university’s good 
faith more generally.  Indeed, he devoted a full paragraph of 
his opinion to the university’s secretiveness regarding the 
implementation of this scheme,72 specifying unsavory details 
such as the intentional minimization of the creation of 
documents and the shredding of such documents as were 
created.  Again, technically this scheme had nothing to do with 
the equal protection challenge in front of the Court, except in 
the very tangential sense that it revealed the university to be 
an untrustworthy institution as a general matter. 
E. Ricci v. DeStefano
A similar focus on a party’s extraneous acts arose in
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano.73  Ricci 
considered the proof burden a city employer had to shoulder 
in order to justify race-conscious action as an appropriate 
response to a claim of disparate impact liability under Title VII. 
It dealt with the City of New Haven, Connecticut, and its 
decision to throw out the results of a firefighter promotion test 
when that test yielded racially-disparate results.  The dissent, 
which would have applied a rule making it easier for the city 
to justify its remedial action, also protested that Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion “le[ft] out important parts of the 
story.”74 
Justice Alito (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) joined 
the majority opinion but also wrote separately to complain that 
the dissent itself “provide[d] an incomplete description of the 
 70 See id. at 2211–12 (majority opinion) (observing that Justice Alito’s 
argument on this point was based on extra-record evidence); cf. Brown v. Entm't 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011) (majority opinion) (noting that Justice 
Alito had done “considerable independent research” to identify particularly 
violent video games). 
71 Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2240 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
72 See id. 
73 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
74 Id. at 608, 609 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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[relevant] events,”75 and to  highlight other facts that he 
believed justified the Court’s rejection of New Haven’s actions 
even under the dissent’s own more employer-friendly 
standard.76  Thus, his opinion explicitly focused on the facts of 
the case.  But his presentation of those facts went well beyond 
what reasonably would have mattered to an argument about 
the appropriate application of the relevant legal standard.77  He 
described an African-American minister, Boise Kimber, a 
major player in New Haven politics and a major force lobbying 
the city to throw out the test results, as a “self-professed 
‘kingmaker.’”78 
To be sure, such a description might conceivably be 
appropriate, given Justice Alito’s claim that the city threw out 
the test results in order to “placate a politically important racial 
constituency.”79  But his description of that “kingmaker” was 
decidedly unflattering, and irrelevant to the underlying issue. 
In describing the political ties between Reverend Kimber and 
the city mayor, Justice Alito described Reverend Kimber as 
having “threatened a race riot during the murder trial of the 
black man arrested for killing [a] white Yalie” who Justice Alito 
named in his opinion.80  He continued that Reverend Kimber 
“continues to call whites racist if they question his actions.”81 
He described his presentation at a public hearing as “a loud, 
minutes-long outburst.”82  Perhaps most strikingly of all, 
Justice Alito observed that the mayor had been a character 
witness at the “kingmaker’s” trial “for stealing prepaid funeral 
expenses from an elderly woman and then lying about the 
matter under oath.”83  He concluded his opinion with a deeply 
sympathetic presentation of the situations faced by individual 
firefighters who scored well on the exam, only to have the test 
results thrown out.84 
75 Id. at 596 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 76 As such, Justice Alito’s concurrence constitutes a classic example of a 
discretionary opinion. 
77 To repeat, he concluded that the facts supported a verdict against the city 
even under the dissent’s proposed standard, which was more favorable to such 
actions. 
78 Id. at 598 (Alito, J., concurring). 





84 See id. at 607. 
Petitioners are firefighters who seek only a fair chance to move up the 
ranks in their chosen profession. In order to qualify for promotion, they 
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III 
EVALUATING THE OPINIONS 
In all of the opinions discussed above, Justice Alito 
emphasized the troubling facts of the particular cases reaching 
the Court.  But before we can evaluate those opinions, and the 
rhetorical style informing them, they must be parsed and 
distinguished.  Differences between these opinions illustrate 
the cautions that one must take before finding meaningful 
similarities between them and in turn evaluating them and 
their potential impact. 
A. Differences, Similarities, and Caveats
First, these opinions feature varying degrees of emphasis
on the troubling, but doctrinally-tangential, facts.  Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Caetano places heavy emphasis on the 
facts, presumably to illustrate how the Second Amendment 
right was implicated by Jaime Caetano’s decision to possess a 
stun gun.  His dissent in Snyder featured a similarly detailed 
presentation of the Westboro Baptist Church’s speech.  By 
contrast, his concurrence in the judgment in Entertainment 
Merchants places relatively less emphasis on the troubling 
facts surrounding the video games at issue, even if his outrage 
(or, as Justice Scalia put it, Justice Alito’s “disgust”)85 
nevertheless heightened the impact of those relatively sparse 
facts. 
Further toward the other end of the spectrum, Justice 
Alito’s accusation in his Fisher dissent that the University of 
Texas had engaged in admissions chicanery occupied only a 
small part of his analysis, albeit one that reinforced the theme 
running through his entire opinion that the university could 
not be trusted to use race-based admissions criteria.  Perhaps 
at the furthest end of the spectrum on this criterion is his 
concurrence in Ricci.  That opinion featured facts—most 
made personal sacrifices. Petitioner Frank Ricci, who is dyslexic, found it 
necessary to hire someone, at considerable expense, to read onto 
audiotape the content of the books and study materials. He studied an 
average of eight to thirteen hours a day . . ., even listening to audio tapes 
while driving his car. Petitioner Benjamin Vargas, who is Hispanic, had 
to give up a part-time job, and his wife had to take leave from her own job 
in order to take care of their three young children while Vargas studied. 
Vargas devoted countless hours to study . . ., missed two of his children’s 
birthdays and over two weeks of vacation time, and incurred significant 
financial expense during the three-month study period. (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). 
85 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 798 (2011). 
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notably that the preacher’s trial at which the defendant-mayor 
testified as a character witness involved unsavory allegations 
of “stealing prepaid funeral expenses from an elderly woman 
and then lying about the matter under oath”86—that would be 
hard to characterize as relevant to the legal standard Justice 
Alito was purporting to apply.  But that apparent drive-by 
attack, as well as his concluding reminder of the human costs 
imposed on the firefighters who had studied for and succeeded 
on the rejected test,87 occupied only minor parts of his factual 
analysis.88 
Perhaps more importantly than these facts’ relative 
prominence in the given opinion, the opinions discussed above 
also differ in the doctrinal role they purported to play in the 
analysis.  For example, in Snyder—unlike in Fisher, 
Entertainment Merchants, and Caetano—Justice Alito 
attempted to explain how those facts refuted the Court’s 
conclusion that the Church’s speech was constitutionally 
protected—either because the speech did not relate to public 
issues or because it possessed the characteristics that Justice 
Alito believed marked the speech as an additional Chaplinsky-
type category of unprotected speech.89  Similarly, it is 
possible—perhaps—to understand Justice Alito’s 
characterization of the political operative in Ricci as a “self-
professed ‘kingmaker’”90 as relevant to his argument that the 
city threw out the firefighter test results due to political 
pressure rather than good-faith doubt about the test’s 
reliability.91 
86 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 598 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring). 
87 See id. at 607. 
88 Other opinions by Justice Alito exhibit similar characteristics, but in 
quantities small enough as to perhaps render them not real exemplars of the 
phenomenon this Essay discusses.  For example, his solitary dissent in United 
States v. Stevens provided a brief but chilling description of an actual “crush 
video,” that is, a sexual fetish video that depicts small animals being crushed by 
a woman wearing sharp heels.  See 559 U.S. 460, 491 (Alito, J., dissenting).  See 
also id. at 482 (describing such videos as “depraved”).  His description was 
apparently designed to establish that such videos constituted animal cruelty, 
conduct that states could and did prohibit, and which thus allowed Justice Alito 
to analogize such expression to child pornography and the constitutional 
argument for allowing its prohibition.  Regardless of whether that description was 
necessary to his argument, it constitutes a sufficiently small part of his opinion 
as to warrant exclusion from this Essay’s consideration. 
89 See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
90 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 598. 
 91 Even accepting this justification for his characterization of that person, 
the added recitation of the particular crime for which that person was tried—
“stealing prepaid funeral expenses from an elderly woman and then lying about 
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By contrast, Justice Alito’s allegation of admissions 
cheating by the University of Texas with regard to legacy and 
politically-influential applicants is only indirectly relevant to 
the question of its good faith with regard to its conclusion 
about the need for race-based admissions criteria.  Even more 
tangential is his catalog of the horrors of violent video games 
in his Entertainment Merchants concurrence—indeed, Justice 
Scalia expressed rhetorical mystification at the point of Justice 
Alito’s attack, at least judged by the standards of conventional 
First Amendment doctrine.92  Finally, Justice Alito’s recitation 
of Jaime Caetano’s facts served only to illustrate graphically 
what the Court conceded to be the case—that her possession 
of the stun gun was protected by the Second Amendment. 
Indeed, the more dramatic parts of his factual presentation in 
Caetano did not even illustrate that doctrinal point.93  They 
were clearly superfluous under any conventional 
understanding of the constitutional analysis. 
Finally, it is surely the case that Justice Alito is not the 
only justice to highlight facts that are, strictly speaking, 
extraneous to the precise legal question at issue.  Far from it. 
Former and current justices from across the ideological 
spectrum have written opinions that highlight troubling or 
outrageous facts, even when a more bloodless opinion would 
have sufficed.  Justice Jackson’s dissent in Terminiello v. 
Chicago,94 an early First Amendment “heckler’s veto” case, 
contained what even he conceded was a “long recital of [the 
troubling] facts.”95  On the modern Court, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges96 began with a long 
introduction to the plaintiff-same-sex couples and their 
reasons for seeking to marry.97  His dissent in Stenberg v. 
Carhart98 provided a graphic description of the abortion 
the matter under oath”—is hard to understand except as an attempt to color the 
reader’s perception of that person.  Ricci, 557 U.S. at 598.  See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
 92 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (suggesting 
that the only point of Justice Alito’s critique of those games would be to 
demonstrate the odiousness of their underlying ideas—a motive that, if true, 
would demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the government’s action). 
 93 See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (recounting the actual dialogue of the confrontation 
between Caetano and her ex-boyfriend). 
94 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
95 Id. at 13–14 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
96 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
97 See id. at 2594–95. 
98 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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procedure the State of Nebraska had attempted to outlaw.99 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co.100 began and ended with a discussion of the facts 
of Lilly Ledbetter’s own encounter with sex discrimination in 
the workplace.101  Slightly more removed, Justice Thomas’s 
anguished quotation from a Frederick Douglass speech at the 
start of his dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger102 has, at 
least formally, little to do with the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was not ratified until three years later. 
These examples make clear that, as a general matter, the 
inclusion of ostensibly extraneous facts is not unique to 
Justice Alito.103 
B. Justice Alito’s Rhetorical Style
Despite the differences between the Alito opinions
discussed in Part II, and despite the similarities between those 
opinions and opinions written by other justices, something 
distinctive remains about Justice Alito’s use of the facts in the 
examples provided above.  In those opinions, he appeared to 
use the facts to convince the reader that his proposed 
resolution of the issue must necessarily be correct.  In other 
words, the picture Justice Alito painted—for example, in 
Snyder of hateful picketers opportunistically latching on to a 
public grieving ceremony in order to gain publicity, and in 
Entertainment Merchants of video games that are novel in their 
depiction of gruesome and anti-social violence—was presented 
99 See id. at 957–60 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
100 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 101 See id. at 643, 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Ironically, Justice Alito 
wrote the majority opinion in Ledbetter, which features a remarkably banal 
statement of the facts.  550 U.S. at 621–22 (“Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter) 
worked for respondent Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (Goodyear) at its 
Gadsden, Alabama, plant from 1979 until 1998.  During much of this time, 
salaried employees at the plant were given or denied raises based on their 
supervisors’ evaluation of their performance.  In March 1998, Ledbetter 
submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC alleging certain acts of sex 
discrimination, and in July of that year she filed a formal EEOC charge.  After 
taking early retirement in November 1998, Ledbetter commenced this action, in 
which she asserted, among other claims, a Title VII pay discrimination claim and 
a claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).”) (internal citation omitted). 
 102 539 U.S. 306, 349–50 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Notably, Justice Scalia, who joined the rest of Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, did not join that introductory portion of the opinion. 
Id. at 349 
103 Indeed, as subpart III.B explains, Justice Sonia Sotomayor may use facts 
in a way somewhat analogous to Justice Alito. 
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as part of his answer to the relevant constitutional question.104 
The meaning of the relevant constitutional provision (in these 
two examples, the First Amendment Speech Clause) is thus 
found in Justice Alito’s perception of what must be obvious 
common sense, as illustrated by the facts he presents.105 
Justice Alito’s rhetoric is distinctive in another way—its 
drama.  His words convey in dramatic—indeed, theatrical—
terms the threat Jaime Caetano faced, the truly awful scenes 
and themes of violent video games, and the pettiness (in both 
meanings of the term) of the larceny of which the “self-
professed kingmaker” in Ricci was accused.  Similarly dramatic 
is his description of the cloak-and-dagger nefariousness of the 
University of Texas’s shadow admissions system (complete 
with references to shredded documents) and, of course, the 
crude and deeply disrespectful signs brandished by the 
Westboro Baptist Church members in Snyder. 
To be sure, Justice Alito does not reject the standard 
“formulaic”106 approach to constitutional adjudication 
employed by his colleagues.  Even in the opinions this Essay 
discusses, he couples the fact-emphasis identified above with 
 104 One might make a similar argument about Justice Kennedy’s argument in 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957–60 (2000), that the gruesomeness of the 
procedure he described justified the state’s prohibition of it in pursuit of its 
legitimate interest “in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State’s 
reasonable determination, might cause the medical profession or society as a 
whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human 
fetus”).  Id. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 105 On this point, a more general point bears noting.  In the context of the 
doctrine governing the identification of unprotected speech (i.e., the “Chaplinsky 
doctrine”), Justice Alito is alone on the current Court (not counting Justice 
Gorsuch) in having declined to join an opinion rejecting ad hoc balancing as the 
proper approach to identifying categories of unprotected speech.  See United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (describing such an ad hoc approach 
as “startling”) (Roberts, C.J., joined by all the justices except Justice Alito); Brown 
v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470)
(Scalia, J., joined by all the justices except Roberts, C.J., and Thomas and Alito,
JJ.); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2011) (Kennedy, J., joined
by Roberts, C.J., and Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.).
One can make too much of this point, but it is surely significant to how 
Justice Alito understands how facts relate to law—that he rejects a purely 
historical approach to the unprotected categories question.  Instead, he appears 
to endorse an approach that forthrightly examines the connection between the 
negative impact a type of speech has and its constitutionally-protected status. 
See generally Calvert, supra note 12 (making a similar argument).  Such an 
approach makes it both appropriate and, indeed, necessary, to consider the facts 
of the case in which the Court must decide that status. 
106 See generally Nagel, supra note 22 at 165 (describing as “formulaic” a style 
of Supreme Court opinion writing that, in the author’s view, had become “the 
most common method of constitutional exegesis” over the thirty years prior to the 
article’s publication in 1985). 
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more conventional approaches to deciding the case at hand. 
As one might expect, this phenomenon is most obvious in the 
cases where his presentation of potentially tangential facts 
occupies a relatively smaller part of his opinion.  For example, 
his analysis of the University of Texas’s race-conscious 
admissions policy largely hews to the Court’s doctrine 
requiring such policies to satisfy strict scrutiny; his discussion 
of the extraneous facts surrounding the university’s legacy and 
politically-influential applicant process occupies a small part 
of a long opinion.  But even in Caetano, which probably 
features the most dramatic exposition of facts, Justice Alito 
was careful to reinforce the per curiam opinion’s doctrinal 
analysis that required the rejection of the state court’s refusal 
to vindicate Caetano’s Second Amendment claim. 
This practice of pairing the more “populist” approach this 
Essay has identified with more conventional legal analysis 
raises a fascinating question of Justice Alito’s goals.  Of course, 
it is impossible to know what he subjectively intended with any 
of these opinions, at least short of his own disclosure of his 
views.107  Objectively, however, it is possible to identify a 
phenomenon illustrated by his practice of combining standard 
doctrinal analysis with more “populist” appeals. 
Over thirty years ago Meir Dan-Cohen coined the term 
“acoustic separation” to refer to the distinction between the 
public’s knowledge of the law at one level (what he called 
“conduct rules”) and judges’ knowledge of the law at a different 
level (what he called “decision rules”).108  While the 
conduct/decision rules distinction is not important for our 
purposes, Professor Dan-Cohen’s idea of a distinction between 
 107 This Essay does not purport to explain Justice Alito’s rhetorical choices 
based on any particular aspect of his personality or upbringing.  Such attempts 
to explain a justice’s (or any other decision-maker’s) substantive or rhetorical 
decisions inevitably encounter a welter of problems.  See, e.g., Adam Hirsh, 
Searching Inside Justice Holmes, 82 VA. L. REV. 385, 395 (1996) (describing the 
methodology of psychohistory as “a deeply problematic exercise, fraught with 
numerous perils”); Peter Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal 
Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (stating that it is “fruitless” and “arguably 
inappropriate” to attempt to “psychoanalyze” justices).  See generally DAVID E. 
STANNARD, SHRINKING HISTORY: ON FREUD AND THE FAILURE OF PSYCHOHISTORY 
(1980) (discussing the merits and problems of such an approach). 
 108 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in the Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–34 (1984).  For a quick 
explanation of the distinction, and of acoustic separation in general, see Legal 
Theory Lexicon 013: Conduct Rules and Decision Rules, LEGAL THEORY LEXICON 
(Sept. 24, 2017), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le_3.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/UFH6-4DGS]. 
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the public’s and the judiciary’s knowledge or understanding of 
the law provides an interesting parallel with Justice Alito’s 
opinions in the cases this Essay has examined.109  In 
particular, one might find in those opinions an “acoustic 
complementarity,” in which Justice Alito’s application of 
standard doctrinal tools appears alongside a more fact-
intensive approach that speaks more immediately to lay 
readers of his opinions.110  On this theory, his engagement with 
his colleagues’ (and the profession’s) more formulaic approach 
to legal issues allows him to remain part of, and influence, the 
professional dialogue, while his simultaneous willingness to 
speak more directly to lay readers, by means of his fact 
presentations and his implicit connection of those 
presentations to the Constitution’s meaning, allows him to 
communicate with a different audience. 
Understanding Justice Alito’s opinions as aspiring to 
engage in two different levels of dialogue with two different sets 
of interlocutors allows us to make two final points.  First, if 
this speculation reflects at least the effect of, if not necessarily 
the intent behind, the Alito opinions examined above,111 then 
the American public may be in for an interesting education 
about constitutional law, from a justice who perhaps wants 
Americans to understand that law at a more direct level, 
unmediated by doctrinal tests.  Whatever one thinks of the 
underlying principles Justice Alito perceives as grounding the 
relevant legal issue,112 it has been years—perhaps decades—
 109 For another example, see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling 
(With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 46–53 (2010) 
(using Professor Dan-Cohen’s terminology to explain a similar disconnect 
between the meaning professional and lay readers have taken from the modern 
Court’s constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence). 
 110 Indeed, it is quite possible that his employment of dramatic facts may be 
highlighted in the popular press’s coverage of those opinions, thus reinforcing his 
communication with lay readers. 
 111 See supra note 107 (disclaiming any intention to probe Justice Alito’s 
subjective motivations). 
 112 It should be noted that this Essay’s focus on the folk or lay character of 
Justice Alito’s focus on facts has elided questions about what those facts 
apparently mean to him with regard to the meaning of the relevant constitutional 
principle.  The clearest example of this is Entertainment Merchants. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Scalia not only criticized Justice Alito for what he 
(Scalia) believed to be the lack of relevance of Alito’s description of the video 
games’ violence and anti-social themes, but further suggested that, if they were 
relevant at all, they actually undermined the law’s constitutionality, by 
suggesting a “disgust” with certain ideas.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 
564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).  It is just as easy to envision a justice embracing a 
libertarian, but similarly “populist,” perspective on the First Amendment.  This 
Essay’s focus on the rhetoric of some of Justice Alito’s writing does not engage 
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since the Court included a jurist who was sincerely interested 
in communicating his view of the law in such terms.113 
Second, if Justice Alito’s rhetoric does in fact engage the 
American public in civic education, that class may be co-
taught.  In two recent opinions, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has 
emerged as a distinctive voice that, in a way akin to Justice 
Alito’s, speaks directly to the American public in addition to 
her colleagues.114  In Utah v. Strieff,115 she dissented from a 
holding that the after-determined existence of a valid arrest 
warrant justified an exception from the exclusionary rule when 
the evidence was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional 
seizure.  In addition to engaging the majority’s doctrinal 
analysis,116 she also discussed, when explicitly writing for 
herself only,117 the effect the majority’s holding would have on 
minority men who would now be subject to the humiliations of 
searches initiated by police officers who were trained to stop 
and search them and then run a warrant check in the hope of 
finding an outstanding warrant that, after Strieff, would cure 
any exclusionary rule violation.118 
Speaking in frank terms unencumbered by formal doctrine 
or even formal trial-type proof, Justice Sotomayor wrote that 
“it is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims 
of this type of scrutiny.”119  Reinforcing the sense of direct 
communication with the lay public, she observed that the 
ability of police officers to stop and search individuals 
seemingly at will—an ability reinforced by the Court’s holding 
in Strieff—has historically caused minority parents to give their 
the question of his substantive commitments. 
 113 See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 22 at 182 (concluding thirty years ago that the 
Court’s standard formulaic approach “exclude[d] the general public from the 
Court’s audience”); id. at 191–92 (providing several examples from earlier periods 
in the Court’s history where justices spoke in a more accessible way). 
 114 For a slightly different perspective on Justice Sotomayor’s distinctive voice, 
see David Fontana, The People’s Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. F. 447 (2014) (focusing 
on Justice Sotomayor’s distinctive practices regarding her extra-judicial 
appearances). 
115 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
116 See id. at 2064–68. 
117 Id. at 2069 (“Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional 
experiences, I would add that unlawful ‘stops’ have severe consequences much 
greater than the inconvenience suggested by the name.”) (emphasis added). 
 118 See id. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the humiliations 
and disparate impact on minorities); id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., joined by 
Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting police training to act in this way).  The latter cite 
is to a part of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent joined by Justice Ginsburg; the former 
cite is to the part of her dissent where Justice Sotomayor spoke only for herself. 
119 Id. at 2070. 
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children “‘the talk’—instructing them never to run down the 
street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not 
even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how 
an officer with a gun will react to them.”120  Supporting these 
observations of social reality—observations that, in her view, 
justified a different result on the underlying Fourth 
Amendment issue—she concluded that portion of her 
discussion by citing writers who discussed racial justice in the 
United States from social and personal perspectives, rather 
than as matters of formal legal doctrine.121 
Equally noteworthy was Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.122  In 
Schuette, the Court upheld a voter referendum that amended 
the Michigan Constitution in ways that, among other things, 
prohibited state colleges and universities from adopting race-
conscious admissions policies.123  A majority of the Court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that that amendment 
unconstitutionally restructured the state’s political process to 
the detriment of minority interests.124  A three-justice plurality 
distinguished a line of cases beginning with Hunter v. 
Erickson,125 which held such restructurings unconstitutional 
to the extent they harmed minority interests.126  Justice Scalia, 
joined by Justice Thomas, critiqued the Hunter line more 
profoundly, calling for its overruling.127 
Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself and Justice 
Ginsburg, dissented.128  As in Strieff,129 the bulk of her analysis 
120 Id. 
121 See id. at 2070–71. 
122 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
123 See id. at 1629 (quoting the amendment in full). 
124 The plaintiffs’ argument, rejected by the Court, was that the amendment 
made it more difficult for minorities to enact their desired policies, by placing 
race-based admissions criteria beyond the reach of the normal political process 
while leaving other admissions preferences subject to that process. See id. at 
1626, 1636 (stating that the “question is not how to address or prevent injury 
caused on account of race but whether voters may determine whether a policy of 
race-based preferences should be continued” and holding that “courts may not 
disempower the voters from choosing which path to follow”). 
125 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 126 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and 
Alito, J.). 
127 See id. at 1639 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Breyer 
concurred on a much narrower ground that allowed him to avoid confronting the 
Hunter line entirely.  See id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In 
my view, however, neither Hunter nor [a successor case] applies here.”). 
 128 Id. at 1651 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
129 See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064–68 (2016). 
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focused on doctrine—in particular, the applicability of Hunter 
and its progeny, which the plurality had distinguished.130  But 
her argument went beyond doctrine.  When engaging both the 
plurality’s and Justice Scalia’s critiques of the Hunter line, she 
also spoke personally, in a way that addressed a central 
question of the Court’s race equality jurisprudence: whether 
the Constitution allowed government—here, the federal courts 
applying Hunter—to take account of race. 
She did so in response to the other opinions’ conclusions 
that Hunter and its progeny “raise serious constitutional 
concerns”131 because of their race-consciousness.  Confronting 
in stark, non-doctrinal language the question whether race 
“matters,”132 she insisted that it did—that is, she insisted that 
the persistence of discrimination required that the task of its 
eradication authorized government (here, courts) to be race-
conscious.  Speaking in terms the public could easily 
understand, she argued that race “matters” because of the long 
history and current persistence of discrimination and because 
of the “stark socioeconomic disparities” caused by “persistent 
racial inequality in society.”133 
But, according to Justice Sotomayor, race “matters” for 
another reason.  In a remarkably personal paragraph, she 
attempted to convey the isolation felt by many members of 
racial minorities in America today: 
And race matters for reasons that really are only skin deep, 
that cannot be discussed any other way, and that cannot be 
wished away. Race matters to a young man's view of society 
when he spends his teenage years watching others tense up 
as he passes, no matter the neighborhood where he grew 
up. Race matters to a young woman's sense of self when she 
states her hometown, and then is pressed, “No, where are 
you really from?”, regardless of how many generations her 
family has been in the country. Race matters to a young 
person addressed by a stranger in a foreign language, which 
he does not understand because only English was spoken 
at home. Race matters because of the slights, the snickers, 
the silent judgments that reinforce that most crippling of 
 130 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1659-63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (applying 
Hunter); id. at 1663-671667 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (critiquing the plurality’s 
and Justice Breyer’s attempts to distinguish Hunter). 
 131 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1675 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. at 1676. 
133 Id. 
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thoughts: “I do not belong here.”134 
Regardless of one’s views about the merits of her 
analysis,135 in these portions of her Schuette dissent Justice 
Sotomayor sought to convey a meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (one that allowed judicial race-consciousness) 
through starkly human terms.  That analysis would not be 
recognizable in a purely elite, doctrinal analysis.  But it speaks 
to lay readers in a way that such a doctrinal analysis never 
could, to the same effect as the fact presentations in the 
opinions written by Justice Alito that this Essay has examined. 
IV 
SAMUEL ALITO: POPULIST 
Webster’s Dictionary defines “populist” as “a believer in the 
rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common people” and as “a 
member of a political party claiming to represent the common 
people.”136  This Essay has examined Justice Alito’s “populism” 
not in the partisan sense of the term, but in the sense of the 
first definition quoted above.  So understood, Justice Alito’s 
populism, as expressed in the opinions this Essay has 
examined, stands in contradistinction to elitism—in particular, 
as expressed in law as neutral, formal legal rules divorced from 
factual contexts. 
Justice Alito’s heavy reliance on the troubling facts of 
particular cases, as if those facts constitute a sort of res ipsa 
loquitur answer to the legal question at hand, implies the folk 
wisdom of what the dictionary definition of “populism” calls 
“the common people.”137  So does his emotional presentation of 
those facts, which similarly suggests, for example, that the 
horrific portrayals of racist violence in violent video games by 
themselves render that speech properly subject to government 
regulation, or that the tense, dangerous confrontation Jaime 
Caetano experienced with her ex-boyfriend necessarily proved 
that the stun gun she carried was protected by the Second 
Amendment. 
Justice Alito’s approach and tone sound a distinctive note 
in Supreme Court opinions.  Scholars have criticized the 
134 Id. 
 135 See, e.g., Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(addressing Justice Sotomayor’s more personal critique directly). 
136 Populist, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/populist [https://perma.cc/227Q-QGE3]. 
137 Id. 
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Court’s opinions for being too long,138 too technical and jargon-
filled,139 and, relatedly, too dependent on doctrinal tests that, 
in the view of one scholar, “exclud[es] the general public from 
the Court’s audience.”140  This Essay does not speak to the 
length of Justice Alito’s opinions.  But it does reveal that some 
of his opinions cut through jargon and doctrinal tests that are 
conventionally thought to decide cases, to reach conclusions 
he presents as self-evident given the facts of the case.  As such, 
they suggest a Constitution whose meaning is even more 
foundational than that implied by its text.141  Instead, those 
opinions suggest that the words reflect a type of common folk 
wisdom in which the text signifies and represents more 
fundamental (if not necessarily unchanging142) truths. 
One may find this approach troubling or welcome.  On the 
one hand, its heavy reliance on the moral equities of the case 
raises serious questions about whether such an approach can 
truly reflect the promise of a Constitution that guarantees 
rights in order to protect them from majoritarian oppression. 
As Justice Scalia stated in Entertainment Merchants, 
responding to Justice Alito’s claim that the majority 
understated the “problem”143 caused by video games, “[t]here 
are all sorts of ‘problems’—some of them surely more serious 
than this one—that cannot be addressed by governmental 
restriction of free expression: for example, the problem of 
encouraging anti-Semitism, the problem of spreading a 
political philosophy hostile to the Constitution, or the problem 
of encouraging disrespect for the Nation's flag.”144 One could 
just as easily add “the problem of disrespectful funeral 
 138 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, A Failure to Communicate, 2012 BYU L. REV. 
1705, 1713 (2012) (noting that “there are ways in which Court opinions fail to 
adequately communicate. First, they have become much too long and thus far 
more difficult for lower courts and government officials to read and rely upon.”). 
139 Id. at 1707. 
140 Nagel, supra note 22 at 182. 
141 Cf. id. (arguing that all forms of doctrine “have the natural effect of 
substituting themselves for primary constitutional meaning”). 
 142 Cf. James Whitman, Note, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note 
on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 
156, 157–158 (1987) (arguing that Karl Llewellyn’s work on the Uniform 
Commercial Code was inspired by nineteenth century German ideas about the 
customary, but evolutionary, nature of the Law Merchant). 
143 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 821(2011). 
 144 Id. at 801 n.8 (citing Nat’l Socialist Party of Am.v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977) (per curiam) (upholding the rights of Nazis to march through a 
predominantly Jewish neighborhood); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) 
(reversing a conviction for Communist speech); and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989) (striking down a flag burning law)). 
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picketers” to Justice Scalia’s own implicit addition of “the 
problem of violent video games” to the type of socially-
disfavored speech that is nevertheless constitutionally 
protected. 
More generally, and as reflected by the speech example 
from the prior paragraph, Justice Alito’s approach may be 
incompatible with a vision of the Constitution that can speak 
to all Americans.  In a polarized age, can an approach that 
relies on the dramatic, troubling facts of the particular case 
before the Court truly be trusted to generate such a broadly-
accepted vision?  Finally, and again relatedly, one should 
recognize the internal limitations of Justice Alito’s method.  It 
is not unreasonable to suggest that, if he considers this 
approach adequate to decide or help him decide a given case, 
then he should utilize it anytime the facts are similarly 
egregious.  The problem, of course, is that egregiousness is in 
the eye of the beholder.  Recall, for example, that it was Justice 
Alito, writing for the Court, who provided an utterly bloodless 
recounting of Lily Ledbetter’s story in Ledbetter v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber,145 leaving it to Justice Ginsburg’s dissent to 
provide the flesh-and-blood details that ultimately made Lily 
Ledbetter a political celebrity and helped ensure enactment of 
a statute overturning the Court’s decision.146 
Nevertheless, there is much to admire in Justice Alito’s 
willingness (sometimes) to cut through the tangle of formal 
legal doctrine to present cases in their starkest, factually-
richest light.  In telling the story of Jaime Caetano’s 
confrontation, including what he described as her 
unwillingness to carry a deadly weapon with which to threaten 
the father of her children, Justice Alito brought into stark relief 
the self-defense bona fides of stun guns, and thus their 
protection by the Second Amendment, in a way that is far more 
compelling than the per curiam opinion’s arid march through 
Heller’s steps.  More tangentially, on one view at least, nothing 
would damage the credibility of the University of Texas’s 
request to be trusted with the problematic power to classify 
based on race as much as the evidence of its lack of 
trustworthiness on other, unrelated, university admissions 
145 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618, 621(2007). 
 146 Ledbetter spoke at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, see Lilly 
Ledbetter, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lilly_Ledbetter 
[https://perma.cc/BK67-H22P], and the law that overturned the result in 
Ledbetter was named Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111–2, 123 
Stat. 5. 
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issues. 
Such direct application of constitutional principles, 
unmediated by abstract doctrinal steps, tells a story of the 
Constitution that is far more accessible to lay readers—the 
general American public.  While the comparison may be 
startling, Justice Alito’s more direct approach can be compared 
to that of Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of 
Education,147 when he stated the obvious truth that “[t]o 
separate [black schoolchildren] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”148 
To be sure, Justice Alito’s (sometimes) insistence on 
deciding cases based on their moral valence, just like Justice 
Sotomayor’s insistence that Americans recognize the reality of 
race in America when considering questions of police conduct 
and political structure, carries risk to the extent those justices 
ground their decisions in particular perspectives that lack a 
foundation in the constitutional text.149  But in terms of its 
communicative power to the American people, this approach 
has much to commend it, at least as a supplement—what this 
Essay has called a “complement”150—to standard doctrinal 
analysis.  One might hope that such an approach could (re-
)engage the American people in the project of thinking about 
constitutional meaning.  The risks of such populist 
engagement are real, particularly in a hyper-partisan age 
contaminated with xenophobia and resurgent public racism. 
If the American people do re-engage, we may not like what they 
insist on.  But the risk of further alienation between the Court, 
the Constitution itself, and the people is perhaps even greater, 
especially if the Court and the Constitution are expected to 
play significant roles in reining in political actors actuated by 
147 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 148 Id. at 494.  Indeed, Brown soon attracted prominent critics who argued, 
analogously to Justice Scalia’s critique of Justice Alito’s outrage in Entertainment 
Merchants, that it was inconsistent with an approach to adjudication that was 
grounded in neutral principles.  See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (1959).  Again parallel to this 
Essay’s analysis, Brown was also praised by scholars who saw in it an undeniable 
moral correctness given the actual facts of segregation that established its 
oppressiveness and structure of racial hierarchy.  See Charles L. Black, Jr., The 
Lawfulness of the Desegregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960). 
149 This may be a less serious problem with Justice Sotomayor’s approach, to 
the extent that her perspective, both in Strieff and Schuette, ultimately rests on 
the equality of all citizens, a goal clearly findable in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
150 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
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that same hyper-partisanship and xenophobia.151 
Ultimately, regardless of whether one likes the 
consequences, we may well be in store for such re-engagement. 
Given the populist tenor of the times, such populist critiques 
of elite lawmaking may find a more ready audience than in 
years past.  In this sense, Justice Alito may well be the justice 
most closely in sync with the national mood. 
 151 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(refusing to dissolve the lower court’s temporary restraining order against the 
President’s travel ban on non-citizens from seven majority-Muslim nations), 
reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017). 
